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I. INTRODUCTION
The law presents many occasions in which an individual's unique
constellation of traits and attitudes is expected to matter. Take, for
instance, the art of jury selection. Trial lawyers understand that
different people often interpret the same evidence differently.
Conventional wisdom holds that people with certain characteristics have
certain attitudes and that these attitudes affect their perceptions of a
case. The jury selection process allows lawyers to identify those
characteristics and thus reject potential jurors who they believe are least
likely to favor their client. Many lawyers therefore regard picking a jury
as the most important step to winning a trial.1 But despite the emphasis
on picking the right person for the jury, evidence supporting the
conventional wisdom that a skilled attorney-or even professional jury
consultants-can identify jurors who are likely to favor their clients is
spotty at best.2
Similarly, lawyers understand that calling forth certain concepts and
imagery can frame evidence in a way that affects how it is interpreted.
Courts forbid a prosecutor from comparing a criminal defendant to
Saddam Hussein or Adolf Hitler, for example, because it evokes
passions and prejudices.' Essentially, a lawyer who uses such a
rhetorical device seeks to activate a particular set of knowledge
structures and beliefs to influence the sense jurors make of the
defendant's actions, motives, and beliefs, a phenomenon that
psychologists call "priming."4  Even the most despicable defendant
1. Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2006) (noting that trial lawyers "view jury selection as one
key to winning their trial"); James W. Mehaffy, A Few Tips on Jury Selection: A View from
the Bench, 63 TEX. B.J. 878, 878 (2000) (arguing that the best trial "lawyers understand that,
above all, jury selection is the most important part of the whole process").
2. See JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 77-78, 99
(2007).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 1 M.J. 235, 238, 240 (C.M.A. 1975) (comparing
defense witness to Hitler was "inflammatory"); Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 265 (Colo.
1995) (reversing conviction where prosecutor analogized defendant to Saddam Hussein
because comparison encouraged jurors to "employ their patriotic passions" and brought to
mind an image of "a bully"); People v. Deasee, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 507, 508 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (reversing conviction where prosecutor referred to notorious mass killings during
argument); Wright v. State, 609 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (reversing conviction
where prosecutor compared defendant to Jack the Ripper and the Boston Strangler).
4. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide to
Priming and Automaticity Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL
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should compare favorably to notoriously evil historical figures, but the
technique can work to a prosecutor's advantage when it succeeds in
reminding jurors both that evil exists and that people-including this
defendant-are capable of monstrous acts.
Thus, it makes sense that lawyers are concerned with individual
differences among jurors and with semantic priming of the jury as a
whole, even if lawyers use different language to describe these concepts.
But another less intuitive psychological phenomenon also bears on legal
decision making-mindset. Put simply, a mindset is a way of making
sense of the world. Specific situational cues make salient not only
relevant knowledge and belief structures but also congruent ways of
thinking. As we describe below, the mindset primed in the moment can
have an important influence on how jurors make sense of the evidence.
Understanding how mindset priming works makes clear that what
matters is not only what people think, but also how they think about it.
In this Article, we discuss the relevance of mindset priming for
various types of legal judgments and decision making. In Part II, we
distinguish mindset from semantic priming and review the psychological
research on mindset priming in non-legal settings. In Part III, we
present the results of two studies showing that priming different
mindsets alters attitudes about legal issues. In Part IV, we discuss the
implications of these findings for other legally relevant situations and
propose further research.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON PRIMING
Psychologists have repeatedly shown that activating or "priming" a
knowledge structure in one context can influence judgments in a
separate, unrelated context.5 Once activated, a knowledge structure can
affect how one interprets subsequent ambiguous events to which the
primed construct relates.6  Conceptual priming involves activating
concepts or mental representations such as traits, values, norms, or goals
that then serve as interpretive frames in the processing of subsequent
AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 253,259 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000).
5. Id. at 258. For a review of research on semantic priming, see generally Jens Forster &
Nira Liberman, Knowledge Activation, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC
PRINCIPLES 201 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
6. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 258.
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information.' Once a concept is primed, other concepts associated with
it in memory are also activated.8
Psychologists have most typically demonstrated this phenomenon
using an unrelated-studies paradigm, in which the experimenter primes
a concept in "Study 1" and then assesses study participants' impressions
in a separate and ostensibly unrelated "Study 2."9 For instance, in one
classic study, researchers exposed participants to words relating either to
the trait of adventurousness or to the trait of recklessness. 0 Later, in
what the experimenter told them was a separate study measuring
reading comprehension, participants read a story in which the
protagonist acted ambiguously with regard to the primed trait, making it
possible to interpret the described behavior either as adventurous or
reckless.1" Participants who had been exposed to words related to
recklessness in the first task were more likely to characterize the
protagonist's behavior as reckless, and those exposed to words related
to adventurousness interpreted the very same behavior as
adventurous. 2  Thus, priming concepts associated with certain
personality traits brought related concepts to mind when people were
faced with new information.
While content priming activates a concept or meaning structure,
cognitive-style or mindset priming activates a way of thinking or mental
procedure.13 Mindsets can be thought of as a procedural toolkit used to
structure thinking. They tell us how to think and provide ways of
reasoning about the world. Mindsets-also called heuristics or naYve
theories-tell us how to process information to make sense of
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 259 (reviewing the studies).
10. E. Tory Higgins et al., Category Accessibility and Impression Formation, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 143 (1977). For discussion of similar experiments
showing how semantic priming can affect how people perceive others, see Thomas K. Srull &
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpretation of Information
About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1660, 1660 (1979) (priming traits of hostility or kindness affected how study participants
judged the protagonist in a story).
11. See Higgins et al.,supra note 10, at 146-48.
12. Id.
13. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 265.
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experience. 4 When a particular mindset is primed, these previously
stored mental procedures can carry over to a subsequent task. 5
One set of fundamental and particularly well-researched mindsets
concerns approaching positive outcomes and avoiding negative ones.
The behavioral activation-behavioral inhibition system can be seen as
the most basic conceptualization of this mindset." The behavioral
activation system activates in response to opportunities for rewards
(such as sex, food, achievement, and success) and evokes reward-
focused action. 7 In contrast, the behavioral inhibition system activates
in response to threat (such as punishment, pain, failure, and loss) and
evokes vigilance to avoid harm. 8 Behavioral inhibition is not the
reverse of behavioral activation; rather, these systems are independent
in the goals they implicate and mechanisms they activate." The focus
one takes depends on whether attaining goals or avoiding problems is
the relevant goal in the situation; it clearly is adaptive to be sensitive to
situational cues as to which is appropriate in the moment." Action is
appropriate when there is the possibility of a reward and the potential
benefits of action outweigh potential costs.2' Conversely, inaction is
appropriate when threat must be avoided and potential costs of taking
the wrong action outweigh its potential benefits.22
Behavioral inhibition can be thought about as a sort of automatic or
pre-conscious vigilance, in which environmental cues set the course of
ensuing information processing.23 Detecting threatening information
tunes attention, perception, judgment, and memory toward outcomes
14. Norbert Schwarz, Situated Cognition and the Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning,
in THE WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
144, 147 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002).
15. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 266; see also Jonathan W. Schooler,
Verbalization Produces a Transfer Inappropriate Processing Shift, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 989,989-91 (2002).
16. See Charles S. Carver & Teri L. White, Behavioral Inhibition, Behavioral Activation,
and Affective Responses to Impending Reward and Punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 319,319 (1994).
17. See id.; Jeffrey A. Gray, Brain Systems that Mediate both Emotion and Cognition, 4
COGNITION & EMOTION 269,278 (1990); E. Tory Higgins, Beyond Pleasure and Pain, 52 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1280,1281 (1997).
18. Carver & White, supra note 16, at 319; Higgins, supra note 17, at 1293.
19. Carver & White, supra note 16, at 319-20.
20. Higgins, supra note 17, at 1284-85.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Randy J. Larsen, Emotion and Cognition: The Case of Automatic Vigilance,
PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA, Nov. 2004, at 5,5.
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relevant to a threat.24 Detecting a threat means that all is not well; one
should proceed with care until assured that the threat is resolved. The
automatic vigilance system accomplishes this by directing cognitive
resources toward potentially threatening information.2 ' Threat does not
freeze action but rather redirects focus toward reducing harm. When
the threat subsides, behavioral activation recurs-one can resume focus
on achieving positive outcomes or rewards without attending to the
possibility of things going wrong.
Researchers have applied their understanding of these systems to
the domain of goal pursuit. When all is well, one can focus on pursuing
goals; when there is the possibility for harm or costly error, one must
instead focus on avoiding harm. This insight informs several lines of
research on mindset. For instance, self-regulatory focus theory posits
that people pursue goals with either a promotion or prevention
mindset.26 Someone with a promotion-focused mindset pursues goals
with an emphasis on achieving ideals and attaining success, while
someone with a prevention-focused mindset is concerned with avoiding
failure and satisfying duties.27 The promotion-focused person is less
concerned with immediate threats to safety and can therefore process
information more heuristically, with less attention to detail than the
prevention-focused person, who must attend more closely to the
environment to resolve potential threats.
Different moods operate in much the same way. A positive mood
signals that all is well and cues less effortful, heuristic processing; in
contrast, a negative mood signals that something in the current situation
is not right and cues more effortful, systematic processing to detect and
fix the problem.28 Inducing a particular mood therefore not only affects
how people feel, but also primes them to process information in a
particular way. For instance, mood can influence moral judgment. One
researcher has shown that people in a positive mood tend to make more
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See Higgins, supra note 17, at 1281.
27. See id. at 1281-82.
28. Karen Gasper & Gerald L. Clore, Attending to the Big Picture: Mood and Global
Versus Local Processing of Visual Information, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 34, 39 (2002); Norbert
Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Feelings and Phenomenal Experiences, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 433, 436 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds.,
1996).
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superficial evaluations of someone engaged in morally questionable
behavior.29
Psychologists have gone beyond approach-avoid-based mindsets to
explore a variety of other mindsets and their influence on cognitive
processing. In one study, experimenters gave participants instructions
designed to cue either deliberative or implementation mindsets.30  A
deliberative mindset involves weighing the pros and cons of taking
action, while an implementation mindset involves planning how one will
implement a project once a decision to take action has been made.3
After receiving the instructions, participants completed unfinished fairy
tales in what they were told was a second, unrelated experiment.32
Participants primed with a deliberative mindset tended to complete the
story with characters contemplating their next steps or seeking advice.33
Participants primed with implementation mindsets, in contrast, wrote
about characters who immediately took action without further
reflection.34
Other researchers have found that people can be primed to think
more readily about ways in which a situation might have turned out
differently.35 Study participants who were exposed to a situation in
which an alternative outcome almost happened engaged in more mental
simulations when faced with a new, unrelated situation.36 That is,
thinking about how a situation might have turned out differently in one
context makes people more likely to consider alternatives in another, a
phenomenon that psychologists call counterfactual thinking.37
29. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test
with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 16 (2005).
30. Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets: Cognitive Tuning
Toward Congruous Thoughts and Information, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1119,
1120 (1990).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id at 1122.
34. See id.
35. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Counterfactuals as Self-Generated Primes: The Effects of
Prior Counterfactual Activation on Person Perception Judgments, 18 SOC. COGNITION 252,
273 (2000); see also Kai Sassenberg & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Don't Stereotype, Think
Different! Overcoming Automatic Stereotype Activation by Mindset Priming, 41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 511 (2005) ("[I]ndividuals posses [sic] a cognitive
procedure allowing to exert control over automatic stereotype activation. This procedure can
be activated by priming a creative mindset.").
36. Galinsky et al., supra note 35, at 252.
37. Id. at 253-54.
20081
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Mindset can also affect whether a person processes information
concretely or abstractly. For instance, distance-both physical and
temporal-provides cues about the appropriate level of processing of
information.38 People tend to process distant objects and events
abstractly-extracting the gist of a set of data to understand its
fundamental qualities and the interrelations among the parts.39 In
contrast, they process proximate objects and events more concretely,
with greater attention to detail and information specific to that
particular situation. ° Importantly, abstract versus concrete reasoning
relates to psychological distance. That is, psychologically meaningful
events feel nearer.4' When the subject matter of a case is personalized,
decision makers feel it could have happened to them; they may then
reason more concretely about the evidence, taking details into account.
Conversely, they may be more likely to process information in a global
way when the case feels distant.42
Perceived power has a similar effect.43 A perception that one has
little power prompts local or more concrete processing; a perception
that one has substantial power cues "big picture" thinking.' Similarly,
the focus one takes in approaching a goal-either achieving positive
outcomes or avoiding negative ones-triggers a particular level of
processing." A success-oriented promotion focus cues abstract
processing, while a failure-avoiding prevention focus elicits concrete
processing.46
These studies address different psychological processes, but they
illustrate an important general principle: it is possible to prime not only
38. Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of Temporal Distance on Level of Mental Construal,
38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 523-24 (2002).
39. Id. at 524.
40. Id.; see also Lera Boroditsky, Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time Through
Spatial Metaphors, 75 COGNITION 1, 1 (2000); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal
Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403,403, 418 (2003).
41. See Liberman et al., supra note 38, at 523-24; see also Boroditsky, supra note 40, at 1;
Trope & Liberman, supra note 40, at 403, 418.
42. Liberman et al., supra note 38, at 523-24; see Boroditsky, supra note 40, at 1; Trope
& Liberman, supra note 40, at 403,418.
43. Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265,
265 (2003); Pamela K. Smith & Yaacov Trope, You Focus on the Forest When You're in
Charge of the Trees: Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 578 (2006).
44. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
45. Jens Forster & E. Tory Higgins, How Global Versus Local Perception Fits
Regulatory Focus, 16 PSYCHOL. ScI. 631, 631 (2005).
46. Id.
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the substance of thought but also its form.47 In all of these studies,
participants were primed not with a particular idea, but with a way of
approaching a task, which affected how they made sense of the world
more generally.48  Taken together, this literature suggests that
situational cues can make salient particular cognitive processes, which
are then likely to spill over to govern subsequent tasks.
Psychologists' work on mindset has the potential to offer
tremendous insight into legal judgments and decision making of all
kinds, yet this research has not been applied to legal situations. There is
every reason to think that various situational factors-such as how case
materials are presented or the manner in which jurors are treated-
affect the mindset of legal decision makers. Indeed, applying what
psychologists have learned about mindset may clarify otherwise opaque
judgment and decision-making processes, such as when two judges see
the same legal issue differently or a jury reaches a decision that appears
contrary to observers' assessment of the evidence. In the next section,
we begin to apply this knowledge to the domain of legal judgments and
decision making, presenting the results of two studies that demonstrate
how priming mindset influences judgments about criminal justice policy.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MINDSET PRIMING ON LEGAL DECISION
MAKING
In two studies, we examined how priming a mindset focused on
either achieving success or avoiding failure influenced legally relevant
judgments. Both studies were approved by the University of Michigan's
Institutional Review Board and conformed to the ethical standards
established by the psychological research community. We provided
informed consent to study participants, randomly assigned them to
experimental conditions, and thoroughly debriefed them after the study.
We applied research about mindsets focused on achieving success
and avoiding failure to examine how activating these systems affects
47. In addition to semantic and mindset priming, goal priming can affect cognition and
behavior. For instance, study participants performed better on an intellectual task when
primed with words related to achievement. John A. Bargh et al., The Automated Will:
Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1014, 1014 (2001). For a review of goal-priming research, see generally Jens
F6rster et at., Seven Principles of Goal Activation: A Systematic Approach to Distinguishing
Goal Priming from Priming of Non-Goal Constructs, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 211 (2007).
48. See, e.g., Forster et al., supra note 47.
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people's approach to legal issues.49 Specifically, we asked participants to
think about either achieving their goals or avoiding harms and then
asked them to report their opinions about constitutional protections for
criminal defendants (Study 1) and about proper punishments for
criminals (Study 2). We hypothesized that priming a mindset focused on
avoiding harm and mistakes would induce in participants a more
measured and cautious approach when considering how to treat people
accused of crimes compared to participants primed to think about
achieving goals and success.
A. Participants and Procedure
In both studies, we recruited participants on the web to fill out a
criminal justice system questionnaire." They were directed to a website
that explained the study and their rights and solicited participation of
those over eighteen years of age. Those agreeing to participate were
asked to click on a bar at the bottom of the screen. The bar-click
randomly sent participants into one of three conditions. These were a no
prime control and two priming conditions: an avoid failure ("avoid")
condition and an achieve success ("achieve") condition. Study 1
included 82 men, 101 women, and 6 participants who declined to
indicate gender;52 Study 2 included 70 men, 161 women, and 2
participants who declined to indicate gender.53
49. See discussion supra Part II.
50. See discussion infra Part III.A for further explanation.
51. We posted invitations to participate in a web-based study about the criminal justice
system on many sites; according to a participant report in Study 1, the participants came from
psychological research (32.8%), current events (30.7%), hobby or other interests (6.3%),
women's magazines (4.8%), and other (25.4%) portals or online forums. In Study 2,
participants reported coming from psychological research (42.9%), current events (10.3%),
hobbies or other interest (7.3%), women's magazines (5.2%), and other (33.5%) portals or
online forums.
52. Study 1 participants identified themselves mostly as white (76.2%, then about 5%
each, African American, Latino, and declined to report), Christian (57.7%, then 19.6% no
religion, 14.3% "other" religion, and 6.9% declined to report), young adults (48.1% 18-25,
M = 29.6, SD = 11.29). They rated themselves politically conservative (17.5%), moderate
(30.7%), liberal (24.4%) or other (27.5%, including socially liberal but fiscally conservative
(2.6%), civil libertarian (4.8%), not interested in politics (15.3%), and declined to report
(4.8%)). Our sample thus included a wider age range, more males, and a somewhat more
racially diverse composition than the student-based sample that is the norm in psychological
research. Samuel D. Gosling et al., Should We Trust Web-Based Studies? A Comparative
Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet Questionnaires, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 93, 97
(2004).
53. Study 2 participants were mostly white (77.3%; 5.6% African American, 5.6%
multicultural, 3.9% Latino), Christian (57.1%; 24.5% no religion, 10.3% "other" religion);
[92:149
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To prime mindset, we asked participants to read from a list of
actions with accompanying photographs that reflected either taking
steps toward achieving a goal (in the achieve condition) or steps toward
preventing harm (in the avoid condition), and to select those actions
that they had taken recently. 4 In the no-prime control condition, we
simply omitted the priming task. After completing the priming task,
participants answered questions about the criminal justice system,
followed by questions about demographic characteristics and debriefing
information.
B. Measures
In Study 1, we presented participants with five questions about their
opinions of the appropriate level of rights to afford criminal
defendants." We based these items on those used in national opinion
young adults (M = 28.39, SD = 9.17), with political orientation of conservative (18.5%),
moderate (25.3%), liberal (33.5%), and other (22.8%: socially liberal but fiscally
conservative, 5.6%, civil libertarian, 3.9%, not interested in politics, 9.9%, declined to answer,
3.4%). Gender and racial composition of this web-based sample was comparable to
traditional samples examined by Gosling et al., supra note 52.
54. In the avoid condition, participants read and selected options from the following:
Americans know that sometimes an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure: Simple measures can save lives. Which of these measures
have you taken to ensure the safety and security of yourself and your
loved ones? Choose as many as apply from the following: (1) Gotten a
vaccination; (2) Worn a safety belt while traveling in a car; (3) Taken
steps, such as washing your hands, to avoid the spread of dangerous
bacteria; and (4) Worn a helmet or taken other precautions in leisure
activities.
Each measure was presented with a picture depicting the activity in the caption. Participants
were then invited to "tell us about any other preventative measures you have taken that were
not included in the last question."
In the achieve condition, they read the following:
Americans pride themselves on their initiative: Sometimes you have
to reach for the stars to achieve a goal. Please tell us about steps you've
taken in your life to achieve your aspirations. Choose as many as apply
from the following: [They were then presented four captioned picture
icons to click on] (1) Taken on a challenge because it was what you
wanted to do; (2) Worked hard to achieve your ambitions at work; (3)
Taken a chance to achieve your dreams; and (4) Lived life for the
moment.
Each picture was presented with a picture depicting the activity in the caption. They were
then invited to "tell us about any other measures you have taken to achieve your aspirations
that were not included in the last question."
55. See Appendix 1 for all items.
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polls. For instance, we asked them how they felt about imposing a
moratorium on the death penalty, and whether people accused of crimes
enjoyed too many or too few rights. Some items had three response
choices and others had four, depending on the nature of the question.
We also tailored the scale of the responses to the questions (e.g., too
many rights to too few rights, strongly support to strongly oppose). We
reverse coded as necessary so that higher responses always represented
greater endorsement of defendants' rights, standardized the responses,
and calculated the mean of all items.56 The final score represented a
general affinity for defendants' rights, with higher numbers indicating
greater support.
In Study 2, we asked participants about the appropriate punishment
for various crimes, again modeling the questions on those used in public
opinion polls.57 For instance, participants indicated what they felt was
the right punishment for murder and whether they approved of the
extent to which the criminal justice system punished violent offenders.
Responses varied by question. We reverse scored as necessary,
standardized responses, and took a mean to create a single score in
which higher values reflected endorsement of harsher punishment:"
C. Results and Discussion
In neither study did participants' responses vary based on their
gender, race, or religion; however, political affiliation did matter. That
is, those who identified themselves as politically conservative favored
granting fewer rights to criminal defendants compared to other
respondents 9 and supported harsher punishments for criminals.6"
Because conservatism bears on people's views of these issues, we tested
the effect of priming in both studies with an Analysis of Covariance,
which allowed us to control for the effect of political conservatism. As
predicted, mindset mattered over and above the effect of political
conservatism: compared to priming an achieve mindset, priming an
avoid mindset increased affinity for rights61 and softened participants'
stance on appropriate punishment for criminals.62
56. M = 0, SD = .71 (after standardization).
57. See Appendix 2 for all items.
58. M = 0, SD = .67 (after standardization).
59. M = -.31, SD = .64 (self-identified conservatives) vs. M = .05, SD = .68 (alt other
respondents), F(1, 175) = 7.31, p < .01.
60. M = .42, SD = .51 (self-identified conservatives) vs. M = -.08, SD = .67 (all other
respondents), F(1, 226) = 22.59, p < .001.
61. We tested this effect using planned contrasts between the two primed conditions,
[92:149
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As hypothesized, priming a mindset focused on avoiding harm
increased participants' focus on protecting defendants' rights compared
to priming a mindset focused on achieving success. Although
conservatives (in either condition) were generally less likely to endorse
defendants' rights and more willing to punish, priming had a statistically
significant effect even when we controlled for conservatism. Priming to
avoid harm increased the extent to which participants endorsed support
for the rights of the accused; focusing on harm prevention seemed to
prompt participants to consider the importance of protecting against
errors of commission. In the context of opinions about the criminal
justice system, that concern translates to guarding against the dangers of
an overreaching state that rushes to judgment and violates civil liberties.
In contrast, an achieve mindset freed participants to focus on attaining
goals; the goal in the criminal justice context is to catch and punish
wrongdoers, which translates into relatively less concern for avoiding
mistakes.
In two studies, we primed a mindset focused on either achieving
success or avoiding failure. That mindset in turn affected how those
participants felt about criminal justice issues. Their personal
characteristics still mattered; political conservatives, not surprisingly,
favored stronger punishments and fewer protections for criminals in the
first two studies. But mindset also mattered. When faced with precisely
the same issues, participants responded differently depending on the
mindset we had previously primed in them. Priming a mindset focused
on avoiding harm and failure made participants more likely to favor
protections from an overreaching state that punishes too rashly and
harshly compared to participants primed with a mindset focused on
achieving success.
These findings raise interesting questions that warrant further
research. We primed mindset in a seemingly innocuous aside, outside
the context of crime, by asking participants to report measures they
have taken in their own lives either to prevent harm or to achieve their
goals, using non-crime-related examples. That mindset then carried over
to influence how they thought about criminal justice policy in general.
But would mindset have the same effect if primed in the context of
which revealed a statistically significant difference, EMM (estimated marginal means) = -.05
(avoid) vs. -.24 (achieve), F(1, 175) = 5.01, p < .05. Estimated marginal means are presented
to account for the inclusion of a covariate (political conservatism) in the analysis.
62. We tested this effect using planned contrasts between the two primed conditions,
which revealed a statistically significant difference, EMM = -.08 (avoid) vs. .13 (achieve),
F(1,226) = 4.07, p < .01.
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safety and avoiding harm related to crime? What if we asked about
appropriate punishment or procedural safeguards for particular
wrongdoers rather than general policy? What if we asked participants
about the best way to treat an accused wrongdoer who committed a
crime against a personalized other? In these cases, priming may have
had different effects. Take the example of people asked to consider
punishment for a personalized crime after being focused on avoiding
mistakes. In this circumstance, people might become less tolerant of
criminals' rights and more willing to punish criminals because they
would define avoiding mistakes in terms of erroneously letting a guilty
party go free rather than on avoiding mistakes in terms of erroneously
punishing an accused but innocent party.
As these thought experiments suggest, priming vigilance against
harm might in some cases induce a tough, law-and-order mentality. In
context, primed or chronically salient mindsets are likely to affect legal
judgments and decision making in complex ways-some obvious and
intuitive and some less so. In the next section we consider likely
consequences of mindset for legal judgments.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MINDSET PRIMING FOR POLICY AND LEGAL
DECISION MAKING
In the previous section, we discussed two studies that showed that
having a mindset focused either on avoiding harm or achieving success
affected people's judgments about criminal justice policy. In this section
we consider how those mindsets and others could affect other types of
legal decision making and discuss common situations that might prime
those mindsets with potentially unintended consequences.
A. Achieve Success Versus Avoid Failure and Burdens of Proof
In a separate study conducted by the authors, participants read
about the police investigation of the shooting death of a convenience
store clerk.63 The investigation focused on a prime suspect against
whom police had gathered a weak circumstantial case. Mindset was
primed in the wording of the instructions. Participants were instructed
either to focus on making sure the investigation succeeded or to focus
on making sure it did not result in a mistake. Mindset priming
(achieving success or avoiding a mistake) did not significantly affect
63. Barbara O'Brien & Daphna Oyserman, The Shield of Defense or the Sword of
Prosecution: How Self-Regulatory Focus Relates to Responses to Crime, J. APPLTED SOC.
PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 12, on file with authors).
[92:149
HeinOnline -- 92 Marq. L. Rev. 162 2008-2009
MINDSETS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS
participants' perceptions of the strength of the evidence, but it did affect
whether they advocated arresting him.64 Participants primed to achieve
success did not find the evidence against the suspect to be any stronger
than did participants primed to avoid mistakes, but achieve-primed
participants were nevertheless more willing to take action based on that
evidence and arrest the suspect.
65
This finding has implications for understanding how jurors interpret
the reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. Many courts refuse to
define reasonable doubt when instructing jurors in criminal cases 66
because they consider the phrase self-explanatory and worry that
attempts to refine it will backfire and make it less precise.67 However,
the current findings imply that jurors can be inadvertently primed to
employ different standards in judging the sufficiency of the evidence.68
This suggests that burdens of proof are not static, self-explanatory
concepts. Rather, what juries perceive as sufficient evidence may
fluctuate based on the salient features of the situation. The framing of a
jury instruction may emphasize the importance of achieving success by
doing justice,69 or the language chosen by an advocate in closing
argument may highlight the cost of making an error. The lab-based
experimental evidence we present here cannot resolve the question of
whether the subtle difference in language used that produced effects in
64. Participants in the achieve-prime condition were 65.75% (SD = 14.57) certain that
the suspect was the culprit, while participants in the avoid-prime condition were 61.83%
certain (SD = 17.05); the difference between these two conditions was not statistically
significant, t(125) = -1.39, p > .10.
65. Of participants primed to achieve success, 71% were willing to arrest, compared to
only 51% of participants primed to avoid failure, X2(I, N = 125) = 5.15, p < .05.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (admonishing
that district courts should not define reasonable doubt); United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d
947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury
definitions of reasonable doubt .... "); Grant v. State, 703 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla. Crim. App.
1985) (emphasizing that trial judges should not define "reasonable doubt").
67. See, e.g., FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 7TH CIR. § 2.07 (1980)
("The Committee recommends that no instruction be given defining 'reasonable doubt."');
United States v. Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[U]se of an instruction
defining reasonable doubt presents a situation equivalent to playing with fire."); see also
Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1955, 1955
(1995) ("[Clourts should not attempt to define the term in conveying the reasonable doubt
concept to juries."). For arguments in favor of defining reasonable doubt to jurors, see
Timothy P. O'Neill, Instructing Illinois Juries on the Definition of "Reasonable Doubt": The
Need for Reform, 27 LOY. U. CH. L.J. 921, 954 (1996).
68. See supra Part 11.
69. See, e.g., H. Alston Johnson III, LA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2.01 ("Above all, the community wants you to attempt to achieve
justice.
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those settings would also produce results in a real trial. However, the
possibility that small language differences matter in setting the standard
for important judgments such as how much doubt is "reasonable"
certainly warrants further empirical study.
B. Counterfactual Mindset and Consideration of Alternatives
Considering alternatives induces a mindset in which people
spontaneously think about how things might have turned out
differently.7" Consider a case in which the defendant argues that it was
not foreseeable that his actions would have caused the plaintiff's
injuries. Jurors hearing the case must put themselves in the shoes of the
defendant and determine what would have been reasonably foreseeable
at the time of his actions.71 If those jurors have previously generated an
alternative explanation as part of another task, they may carry over that
mindset to the task of evaluating what the defendant should have
foreseen given the information available at the time. If generating an
alternative outcome comes relatively easily, the jurors may be more
likely to conclude that the defendant should have foreseen the particular
consequences that came about from his actions. On the other hand, if
generating alternative outcomes feels difficult, they may be more
72
sympathetic to the defendant's failure to foresee the plaintiff's injuries.
70. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes:
Priming the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 384 (2000).
71. See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS. OF THE 3D CIR, §
9.4.1 (2006) ("[I]f [plaintiff's] injury was caused by a later, independent event that intervened
between [defendant's] act [or omission] and [plaintiff]'s injury, [defendant] is not liable unless
the injury was reasonably foreseeable by [defendant].") (alterations in original); ARK.
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI § 1003 (2007) ("A manufacturer of a [product] has
a duty to give reasonable and adequate instructions with respect to the conditions and
methods of its safe use when danger is reasonably foreseeable in its use .... ").
72. But having a jury consider too many alternatives can have the opposite effect-
making the course of events that occurred seem inevitable. People use feelings of fluency to
inform judgments. That is, if something feels difficult, it seems less likely to be correct, but
something that feels easy seems right. It might be easy to imagine how the defendant's
actions could have led to a different result, but generating many alternative outcomes would
usually be more challenging. Thus, a jury helped to see just one alternative may come to see
other alternatives as possible, but a jury asked to generate many alternatives might find this
task difficult and perceive the current outcome as the only one possible. See Lawrence J.
Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Debiasing the Hindsight Bias: The Role of Accessibility
Experiences and (Mis)attributions, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287, 287, 293 (2003);
Norbert Schwarz, Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences: The Interplay of
Declarative and Experiential Information in Judgment, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 87, 87-88 (1998).
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Sentencing decisions present another way in which the generation of
counterfactuals may be relevant. Jurors in capital cases are often asked
to determine whether a defendant poses a risk of future
dangerousness;73 similarly, when determining a sentence, judges in non-
capital cases consider the likelihood that a particular defendant will
recidivate.74 A defendant who seems apt to repeat criminal behavior in
the future is more likely to receive a harsher sentence than one who
does not seem to pose a danger. The easier it is for the judge or juror to
consider alternative outcomes, the more plausible it should seem that
the defendant will deviate from past behavior. In other words, decision
makers primed to generate just one counterfactual might consider a
defendant with a criminal history to be more likely to obey the law
despite past behavior, leading them to impose a less severe sentence.
A counterfactual mindset might also affect how appellate judges
evaluate the prejudicial effect of trial errors on criminal convictions.
Courts are reluctant to overturn convictions for technicalities and
therefore deem some trial errors as "harmless. ' 76  An appellate court
considers an error harmless if it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.77 In other words, the
reviewing court determines whether the same verdict would have been
reached even if the error had not occurred; if the court believes that the
jury could have reached a different verdict but for the error, the
conviction cannot stand.78
73. See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS.
OF THE 8TH CIR. § 12.08 (2007) (listing as a factor to be considered in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty that the defendant "would be a danger in the future to the lives and
safety of other persons"); WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL WPIC § 31.07
(1994) (instructing jurors in capital cases to consider "[w]hether there is a likelihood that the
defendant will pose a danger to others in the future").
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring that sentencing judges consider
"the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant"), invalidated in part on other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
222 (2005) (holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.12(A) (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that sentencing judges "shall consider
the factors ... relating to the likelihood of the offender's recidivism").
75. See§ 2929.12(A).
76. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); see also Jeffrey S. Jacobi,
Mostly Harmless: An Analysis of Post-AEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Harmless Error Determinations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 805,805 (2007).
77. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
78. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,279 (1993).
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Harmless error review therefore requires a reviewing court to
engage in counterfactual reasoning.7 9 Appellate judges must determine
whether a case might have gone differently if the jury had never been
exposed to an inadmissible piece of evidence, or if the prosecutor had
not been allowed to make an improper argument. The easier it is for
the appellate judges to imagine an alternative outcome, the more likely
they should be to find that the jury would have returned a different
verdict but for the trial error. A counterfactual mindset would enhance
the facilitation of alternatives, and might therefore make a judge less
likely to find a trial error harmless.
C. Perceived Power
Power is associated with seeing the big picture; lack of power is
associated with focusing on details.'0 As the authors of one study on the
psychological implications of power explained, bosses have five-year
plans, employees worry about getting through the week."l As in the case
of temporal distance, what matters is perceived power. Depending on
how they are treated, jurors can feel powerful or powerless. They may
feel like small parts in a big process, but as a group, jurors actually have
tremendous power. Appellate courts largely defer to juries' findings of
fact and assessments of witness credibility, even though jurors are never
asked to justify their decisions.82 Consequently, they can choose to
acquit a defendant who they believe committed the elements of an
offense when they feel that the law itself or its application in that
particular case would be unjust." But no one tells jurors of this power,
and they may not perceive themselves as powerful. Rather, many jurors
report being intimidated by the process-they are unfamiliar with the
rules of trial, the judge seems omnipotent, and the lawyers talk over
79. See David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 483, for a discussion of the philosophical problems presented by
counterfactual analyses.
80. See Keltner et al., supra note 43, at 265; Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
81. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
82. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 738 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[TJhe court must
defer to a jury's credibility determinations and resolutions of conflicts in testimony, weight
accorded to evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn from the basic facts to reach ultimate
factual conclusions."), abrogated on other grounds by Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399, 406
(6th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. United States, 756 A.2d 458, 461 (D.C. 2000) ("In recognizing the
jury's role in weighing the evidence, [this court] will defer to its credibility determinations, as
well as its ability to draw justifiable inferences of fact.").
83. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243-47 (1999) (discussing historical
justification for allowing juries this power).
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their heads. 4 If they perceive themselves as being in a position of low
power, that perception may affect how they process information-if
they feel that they lack power, they may focus more on the details of a
case with less attention to the big picture."
A perception of power or lack of it could therefore affect decision
making in several ways. Decision makers who process evidence with
greater attention to detail may be better at following the evidence in a
complex case-one in which causation is not obvious and that requires
an understanding of statistical probabilities, such as in a product liability
case against a drug company where it is not clear whether the
defendant's product caused the plaintiffs' injuries. They may be less
likely to rely on heuristics, hesitating to conclude that where there's
smoke there's fire, for instance, or to award damages to a plaintiff
simply because a defendant is unsympathetic or has deep pockets.
Legal actors may inadvertently signal to jurors that they either have
power or lack it, with unintended consequences. For instance, some
judges take great care to make jurors comfortable by explaining
courtroom procedures, making sure they do not wait, and treating them
with respect. Other judges are less able to attend to jurors' comfort,
leading those jurors to feel powerless. Attorneys may also cue
perceptions of power inadvertently. A lawyer may emphasize in closing
argument the gravity of the jury's decision in an effort to motivate the
jury to process evidence more carefully. The lawyer may instead evoke
a mindset associated with power, reminding the jury that it, and no one
else, has the power to decide, and thus induce the jury to engage in less
detailed processing. Whether such an argument would have this effect is
far from certain and requires empirical testing to know for sure. But
presumably most advocates seeking to motivate deeper processing of
the evidence would not even consider the possibility that reminding
jurors of their power could backfire.
D. Deliberative-Implementation Mindset and Criminal Investigations
When police officers investigate a crime, they must first figure out
what happened-who did it and why. But at some point in every case
84. Diane Wiley, Practical Tips for Jury Selection in Civil Rights Cases: Bad Attitudes
and Other Common Problems, in 11 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATTON AND ATTORNEY FEES
ANNUAL HANDBOOK 15-1 (1995), available at
http://www.njp.com/articles/PracticalTipsforJurySelection.pdf ("[Miany jurors tell us they feel
nervous and often intimidated, they are worried about being 'cross-examined."')
85. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
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that ends in prosecution, investigators must shift their attention from
determining what happened to proving it. That is, once they have
identified a suspect and developed a theory of the case, investigators
must gather evidence to allow the prosecutors to prove that case in
court. This shift from investigation to case building allows for action but
presents a risk that investigators will overlook new evidence that
undermines their theory of a case. Evidence that points to another
suspect or calls into question the suspect's guilt may arise later in the
investigation, after investigators have psychologically committed to a
theory that the suspect is guilty. Understanding how investigators make
this shift and its consequences for how they search for new information
therefore offers insight into the investigatory process and for improving
accuracy of criminal investigations.
Deliberative and implemental mindsets appear to be at work in this
process. The task of choosing a course of action activates a different
mindset than does the task of implementing it. Thus, people who are
still deliberating on a goal process information differently than do
people who take the next step and begin to implement that goal. 6 In
particular, people in a deliberative mindset weigh information in a more
even-handed and objective way than do people in an implemental
mindset, who tend to be more optimistic about their likelihood of
success.87 This makes sense; attending to the pros and cons of a decision
before committing to it allows one to choose the best course of action;
after committing to that goal, second-guessing that decision would
generally slow progress.88 In light of this research, it would be
reasonable to predict that an investigator who approaches a case with a
deliberative mindset would be relatively receptive to evidence that
exculpates a suspect and generally more open-minded about the
possibility of other suspects; once that investigator decides to pursue a
particular culprit, he or she should show greater bias and be less able to
evaluate evidence objectively. Further studies applying research on
deliberative and implemental mindsets to criminal investigations have
the potential to reveal useful insights into how investigators search for
and interpret information, and how they may fall short.
86. Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., Planning and the Implementation of Goals, in HANDBOOK
OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 211, 211-12 (Roy F.
Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004).
87. See id.
88. Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions, 69
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 223-25 (1995).
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E. Mindset Fit and Persuasion
Mindset may also be relevant to likely success of persuasion
attempts. When an approach to working on a problem is congruent with
current mindset,89 the approach feels more appealing than if the
approach requires shifting gears. Researchers have found that this fit
affects whether people find a message persuasive. In one study,
participants primed to focus on achieving ideals were more persuaded
by messages imploring them to eat more fruits and vegetables when that
message was framed in terms of pursuing goals and aspirations; in
contrast, participants primed to be vigilant in satisfying duties and
staying safe were more persuaded when those messages were framed in
terms of avoiding bad outcomes."
Thus, framing a persuasive message to match the listener's mindset
can make that message seem more compelling, an obvious concern for
any lawyer who must persuade a jury to accept a certain view of the
facts or a judge to rule favorably on a point of law. Moreover, the
potential for enhancing the persuasiveness of a message could extend to
other mindsets. For instance, a listener in a deliberative mindset may
find a message framed in terms of weighing options more persuasive
than someone in an implemental mindset. Conversely, a listener in an
implemental mindset would be more amenable to an argument focused
on the benefits of taking action." Again, further empirical research is
necessary to know the extent to which fit between an argument and the
listener's mindset enhances persuasiveness in legal settings.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers intuitively understand that individual differences matter for
legal judgments and decision making, and that calling forth certain
concepts can affect how people interpret and judge evidence. But
lawyers generally overlook the influence of mindset on those very same
judgments-that is, they fail to consider how situational cues can prime
a way of making sense of the world that affects how people perceive
evidence and receive arguments.
Ignoring mindset means neglecting the third piece of the decision-
making puzzle. Consider common situations involving legal decision
89. For a review, see Joseph Cesario et al., Regulatory Fit and Persuasion: Transfer from
"Feeling Right," 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388, 389 (2004).
90. Id. at 391.
91. See Gollwitzer et al., supra note 86.
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making-a judge ruling on an evidentiary matter, a jury determining the
guilt of a criminal defendant, or a police officer deciding whether to
arrest a suspect. The first piece of the puzzle is the individual decision
maker-the person's attitudes, past experiences, and motivations can
affect how individuals perceive and weigh the evidence. The subject
matter at issue also matters-a child molestation case may elicit
different reactions than would a simple negligence suit. The final piece
is mindset-the mental procedure the decision maker applies to the
problem. Mindset bears on decision making in subtle but potentially
powerful ways; it affects whether one attends to details or focuses on the
big picture, whether one exercises restraint or rushes to take action, and
whether one readily generates counterfactuals or sees a given outcome
as the only one possible-to name just a few.
In unambiguous situations, mindset may be less central than in more
ambiguous situations. A murder suspect caught holding the bloody
knife over the corpse may not escape conviction because his clever
attorney primed the jury to exercise caution in its deliberations unless
there are other reasons to doubt that what seems to be really is. The
effect of mindset should be more clearly evident in close cases, such as
when a jury must grapple with the reasonable doubt standard or a judge
must decide whether to go beyond existing precedent in a novel case. In
these cases, mindset could play an important and underappreciated role
in decision making. We have attempted to show how this might happen
by offering ways in which mindset could affect judgment in a variety of
legally relevant situations. Our integrative review and new studies
suggest that inducing a mindset focused on either achieving success or
avoiding mistakes affects how people view controversial criminal justice
issues, hinting at a larger phenomenon that warrants further empirical
study. We offer hypotheses about other mindsets and their potential
effects in legal contexts as an appeal for further research in this largely
overlooked phenomenon.
APPENDIX 1
Rights of Criminal Defendants
1. How do you feel about the rights given to people who are accused of
crimes?
a. The legal system gives them too many rights.
b. The legal system gives them the correct amount of rights.
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c. The legal system gives them too few rights.
2. How do you feel about the rights given to people who have already
been convicted of crimes?
a. The legal system gives them too many rights.
b. The legal system gives them the correct amount of rights.
c. The legal system gives them too few rights.
3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is more
important to let ten guilty people go free than to punish one innocent
person for a crime that he/she did not commit."?
a. Strongly agree
b. Somewhat agree
c. Somewhat disagree
d. Strongly disagree
4. Some people have proposed amending the Constitution to require
that everyone accused of a crime be accompanied by a lawyer during all
questioning by law enforcement officers. Would you favor or oppose
this change in the Constitution?
a. Strongly favor
b. Somewhat favor
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
5. Recently, the governor of Illinois declared a moratorium on
executions in that state until the procedures surrounding the death
penalty could be reviewed. Do you think there should be a temporary
moratorium or halt in the death penalty to allow government to reduce
the chances that an innocent person will be put to death, or do you think
there should not be a moratorium because there are already sufficient
safeguards to prevent the execution of innocent people?
a. Strongly favor a moratorium
b. Somewhat favor a moratorium
c. Somewhat oppose a moratorium
d. Strongly oppose a moratorium
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APPENDIX 2
Punishment of Convicted Criminals
1. For criminals convicted of premeditated murder, which of the
following do you think is usually the most appropriate sentence?
a. 25 years in prison
b. Life in prison with the possibility of parole
c. Life in prison without the possibility of parole
d. The death penalty
2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If a gun is
used during a crime, the sentence should be twice as long."?
a. Strongly support
b. Somewhat support
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
3. In general, how do you feel about the way the criminal justice system
punishes people convicted of drug offenses?
a. It treats them too leniently.
b. It treats some people too harshly, and others too leniently.
c. It usually imposes fair sentences.
d. It is too harsh.
4. In general, how do you feel about the way the criminal justice system
punishes people convicted of violent offenses, like assault or murder?
a. It treats them too leniently.
b. It treats some people too harshly, and others too leniently.
c. It usually imposes fair sentences.
d. It is too harsh.
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